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O objetivo deste artigo é destacar o processo de negociação do Protocolo de Nagoya
sobre a utilização dos recursos genéticos, adotado em outubro de 2010. Ao  abor-
dar os mitos e realidades associados à exploração da biodiversidade em uma pers-
pectiva mais ampla, busca-se discutir como e por que os argumentos utilizados
por países desenvolvidos e em desenvolvimento foram finalmente conciliados,
resultando em um novo quadro jurídico internacional. O artigo demonstra em que
medida  este Protocolo permite aplicar o disposto na Convenção sobre a Diversi-
dade Biológica de forma coerente à legislação internacional pertinente (por exem-
plo, referente à propriedade intelectual). Também pretende avaliar se o protocolo
permitirá reduzir a sempre existente lacuna entre os conceitos jurídicos construídos
pela «biodiplomacia» e as necessidades reais e práticas de cientistas e empresas.
Por último, procura estimar o impacto deste documento e sua aplicação sobre as
estruturas já existentes, com foco na experiência brasileira.
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RESUMO
ABSTRACT
The purpose of this article is to highlight the process of negociation of the Nagoya
Protocol on the use of genetic resources, adopted in october of 2010. While providing
an overview of the myths and realities of biodiversity exploitation, it discusses
how and why the arguments used by developing and developed countries were
finally conciliated, resulting in a new international legal framework. The article
shows wether the Protocol manages to implement Convention on Biological
Diversity and to be consistent with relevant international law (on intellectual
property for instance). It also aims at assessing if the Protocol is likely to reduce
the everlasting gap between the legal concepts built by « biodiplomacy » and the
actual needs and practices of scientists and companies. It finally estimates the
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Introduction
The Convention on Biological Diversity
(CBD) was adopted at the Earth Summit in Rio
de Janeiro in 1992. Article 1 sets out three ob-
jectives: the conservation of biological diversi-
ty, the sustainable use of its components and
the fair and equitable sharing of the benefits ari-
sing out of the utilization of genetic resources.
Despite being initially designed as an internati-
onal convention whose purpose was to ensure
the preservation of the environment and, at the
same to apprehend the diversity of its constitu-
ent elements and their interactions, the CBD has
for the most part become an instrument which
crystallizes dreams of planetary equity and ho-
pes of economic prosperity, founded on the use
of “green gold” from which it is envisaged that
biotech industries will develop the medicines of
tomorrow. Nevertheless, three instruments were
adopted in Nagoya: in addition to the “Nagoya
Protocol on Access to Genetic Resources and
the Fair and Equitable Sharing of Benefits Ari-
sing from their Utilization”, a strategic action
plan with 20 objectives to 2020 (which are as-
sumed to address the first two objectives of the
CBD: conservation and sustainable use) and a
financial mechanism for implementation of the
Convention.
The 10th Conference of the Parties to the
CBD was held in Nagoya from October 18 throu-
gh into the small hours of October 30, 2010. It
brought together 173 participating countries.
Against a backdrop of continuing erosion of bio-
diversity, despite 18 years of international nego-
tiations, the results of COP 10 were assessed lar-
gely in terms of the development of a Protocol
on Access and Benefit-Sharing (ABS). And so it
was that a commercial and industrial agreement
was hailed as a victory for biodiversity, even if
questions remain as to whether it really addres-
sed any significant economic issues.
The first purpose of this article is to highli-
ght the different dynamics which led to an agre-
ement, and to study the text of the Nagoya Pro-
tocol in order to show how the controversies
were defused by means of careful wording. The
second is to provide a full overview of the new
regime. The CBD left a number of issues uncle-
ar: does the Protocol resolve these issues, in ter-
ms of its field of application and the balance of
the rights and obligations of supplier and user
countries? While States may have felt that a sa-
tisfactory compromise had been achieved with
regard to the issues they had identified (derivati-
ves, retroactive application, responsibilities of
user States for their nationals, etc.), to what ex-
tent is the new framework operational for those
actually using the system (companies, scientists,
and so on)? What impact will the new rules have
on the practices developed since 1992?
Indeed, the majority of CBD negotiations
related to the third objective of the Convention:
the fair and equitable sharing of the benefits ari-
sing out of the utilization of genetic resources. It
is hardly surprising that this objective, which is
so different from the first two and which brought
on board Southern countries reluctant to make
environmental commitments with nothing in re-
turn, has become a theatre of a North-South con-
frontation. For Southern countries, benefit-sha-
ring means putting an end to biopiracy (a con-
temporary version of Third-World plundering):
it means at last reaping the benefits of the use of
natural resources and of local knowledge by
Northern countries. Benefit-sharing also means
subscribing to the belief that there is a market for
genetic resources capable of fuelling a new eco-
nomy based on knowledge and biotechnologies,
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the effects of which would promote the preser-
vation of biodiversity (Aubertin, Pinton, Bois-
vert, 2007). This prospect has given rise to con-
siderable speculation, which has in turn genera-
ted an atmosphere of suspicion due to poorly
defined aims and vague legal frameworks.
The CBD has certainly set out the terms of
the debate and affirmed some underlying princi-
ples. Southern countries have emphasized their
desire to control their genetic resources; they are
also seeking to enshrine their right to benefit from
a share of the added value created in Northern
countries, at the end of the added value chain.
For the latter, the objective is to have easy ac-
cess to resources, be able to rely on a clear legal
framework favorable to conflict-free trade, and
consolidate the possibility of protecting innova-
tions derived from these resources by intellectu-
al property rights. In 2002, at the Johannesburg
Summit, the Southern countries expressed a wish
to negotiate an international regime covering
ABS, in order to enable better implementation
of the principles contained in the CBD. The prin-
ciple of a Protocol was adopted at the COP 8 in
Curitiba. This left everything else open to defini-
tion, including the general economy of the Pro-
tocol, the tools and procedures to be implemen-
ted, and its status.
COP 10’s outcome was eagerly awaited.
Following the Conference of the Parties to the
Copenhagen Convention on Climate Change,
many observers felt that the days of major inter-
national United Nations conferences organized
on the basis of the “one country, one vote” prin-
ciple were over. Amid the financial crisis and the
persistent refusal of the United States to get on
board, it appeared that solutions to global envi-
ronmental problems would have to be found by
means of agreements between countries or regi-
ons. The France-Norway initiative, an interim
partnership for the REDD program1, which took
place on the fringes of the convention’s negotia-
ting sessions, offered one example of this.
The COP 10 also opened amid growing
concerns about the continued erosion of biodi-
versity. The most recent Global Biodiversity
Outlook (GBO-3) sounded an alarm for humani-
ty: “ The action taken over the next two decades
will determine whether the relatively stable en-
vironmental conditions on which human civili-
zation has depended for the past 10,000 years
will continue beyond this century. If we fail to
use this opportunity, many ecosystems on the
planet will move into new, unprecedented states
in which the capacity to provide for the needs of
present and future generations is highly uncer-
tain”. (Secretariat of the Convention on Biolo-
gical Diversity, 2010, p.15). No government ad-
mitted to having fully met the objective, set at
the World Summit on Sustainable Development
in Johannesburg in 2002, of achieving a signifi-
cant reduction in the current rate of biodiversity
loss. One fifth of them expressly stated that this
objective had not been met.
At the same time, the Southern nations con-
demned an absence of binding financial and legal
measures. The COP 10 confirmed the rise of
major emerging powers (such as Brazil, India,
Indonesia and China, already a major presence
in Copenhagen) and their intransigence as to the
reality of rich countries’ commitments. As an
opener, Brazil demanded one billion dollars an-
nually to protect flora and fauna through to 2020.
It announced that if the Protocol was not adop-
ted, there could be no question of approving the
strategic plan for the preservation of biodiversi-
ty, or any of the related financial issues. The G77
+ China also announced that the three issues were
linked: either the “package” as a whole went
through, or nothing did. Attention therefore
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inevitably focused on discussions on funding and
the Protocol, thereby partially obscuring the pro-
gress made on the strategic plan.
This article will be organized as follows:
The first section will focus on the pros and cons
of the need for a Protocol, while the second sec-
tion will assess to what extent the results of the
biodiplomacy bargaining are deemed satisfactory
or even “workable” by the actors who are actu-
ally confronted with the legal system (scientists,
companies, indigenous peoples…).
1. The Appropriateness of a Protocol
Should a Protocol have been adopted, and
if so, why? The answer is clearly yes for the Sou-
thern countries, much less so for the Northern
countries. Nevertheless, as discussions progres-
sed, the positions of the various parties develo-
ped as others made concessions, so that the adop-
tion of a Protocol became inevitable and indeed
beneficial for all. After explaining the initial Nor-
th-South divide, this section will show how the
Protocol came to be seen as an opportunity to
extend or clarify the field of application of the
CBD, as well as a possibility to expand the ABS
logic into fields not strictly envisaged by the CDB
(such as intellectual property issues). The last part
will expose the private actors’ wishes for a new
legal framework.
1.1 An Initial Divide
Since 2002, megadiverse2 countries had
been calling for the establishment of an internati-
onal regime for Access and Benefit-Sharing
(ABS). Prior to the COP 9 in Bonn in 2008, ne-
gotiations foundered particularly on the issue of
whether the text to be adopted by the COP 10
should be legally binding, or whether it should
consist solely of proposals to guide action by
States. Positions are quite clear in this respect.
On the one hand, Australia, Canada and New
Zealand felt that most of any ABS regime alrea-
dy existed in the form of national legislation, and
that any international regime should be sufficien-
tly flexible to take into account a diversity of
national approaches. The Bonn Guidelines (a non-
binding text adopted in 2002) were held up as a
relevant framework in this respect. On the other
hand, most African, Latin American, Asian and
Pacific countries argued that only a legally bin-
ding international text could ensure equitable
benefit-sharing. Ultimately, the European Union
positioned itself as an arbitrator, adopting an in-
termediate position. It held that making interna-
tional standards official should make it possible
to establish standard Material Transfer Agree-
ments (MTAs) and conformity certificates, allo-
wing States a certain degree of room for manoeu-
vre in terms of implementation, at the same time
as ensuring that the objectives of the regime were
fulfilled. The coalition of megadiverse countries
did not respond unanimously to this proposal:
some accepted that the regime could be made up
of a mix of binding and non-binding components.
At the end of the day, the COP 9 resulted in a
relatively insignificant consensus: some compo-
nents of these national regimes would be legally
binding – but it was not specified which ones.
Unlike a framework agreement, which is
only binding in nature if a country transposes and
clarifies its provisions within national legislati-
on, a Protocol entails a stronger commitment on
the part of States. Northern countries felt that it
would be enough to use parts of existing inter-
national instruments and various agreements, bin-
ding or otherwise, such as the large number of
initiatives proposing standard access procedures
(botanical gardens, International Society of Eth-
nobiology, International Federation of Pharma-
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ceutical Manufacturers and Associations -IFP-
MA- guidelines, and so on). Before even consi-
dering a Protocol, the Northern countries pre-
ferred to see the question of ABS dealt with at a
national level, thus enabling each State to esta-
blish a framework in line with its characteristics
and needs, rather than having to fit in with a sin-
gle international measure. For these countries,
the obligations already present in the CBD were
sufficient; before adopting any new legislation,
countries should comply with Paragraph 1 of ar-
ticle 15 of the CBD3. The Northern countries also
insisted on the fact that the Parties had commit-
ted to simplifying access to genetic resources
(Art. 15.2), with no discrimination between fo-
reign and national requesting stakeholders. Sta-
tes could even choose to make their resources
freely available, as it had been the case of Aus-
tria, Denmark and Sweden.
Southern countries felt that the implemen-
tation of the legal framework should not be seen
solely in terms of the moment of access, nor
should it place all the burden of control on coun-
tries supplying genetic resources. They argued
that user countries also had their responsibilities,
and should have a legal framework to control
their nationals and traceability of the resource
through patent lodging and product marketing.
According to this reasoning, a Protocol would
be a way of compelling Northern countries to
take this dimension into account.
1.2 The possibility of extending or clarifying
the field of application
Since the CBD, the material field of appli-
cation of ABS has been the subject of many ap-
proximations and adjustments. Both Northern
and Southern countries have sought to clarify this
aspect, which is clearly fundamental. A working
group studied various ways of defining biologi-
cal resources, genetic resources, derivatives and
products. Article 15 of the CBD deals only with
genetic resources, and not biological resources,
but the boundary between the two categories is
blurred. Similarly, the distinction between rese-
arch for commercial and non-commercial pur-
poses is not clear, despite the fact that the latter
could be the subject of a much more strai-
ghtforward authorization procedure (as is the
case in many countries), even if the CBD does
not specify this explicitly.
Conflicts during the Nagoya negotiations
came to a head with regard to “products and
derivatives”. The third objective of the CBD de-
als with the use of genetic resources. Northern
countries argued that derivatives and products
fell firmly within the remit of the World Trade
Organization (WTO). However, the creation of
wealth (and thus of benefits which may be sha-
red) does not take place as result of the use of
DNA, or the genes themselves, but (in 89% of
cases according to the megadiverse group of
countries) as a result of research and develop-
ment regarding biochemical components (which
include not only natural molecules, but also syn-
thetic products which copy a natural molecule,
medicines and so on). According to this argu-
ment, a Protocol dealing only with the use of
genetic resources in the strict sense of the term,
and not derivatives, would therefore be meanin-
gless. The issue of access to genetic resources
was broadened to include the issue of ownership
of products and derivatives (molecules, raw ex-
tracts from organisms, any element taken from
the metabolism of organisms, etc.), synthetic pro-
ducts copying a natural molecule (biomimetics)
and commercial products including medicines.
This line of reasoning would mean that requests
for compensation could be made for any medici-
ne if it could be demonstrated that it was derived
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from molecules extracted from plants which were
not declared when the patent was lodged. The
Southern countries also demanded that access to
herbaria and other collections established prior
to the implementation of the CBD should be sub-
ject to the Protocol. Their reasoning was that
access is always “new” in the sense that it uses
new means of research and seeks new types of
use. Such demands amounted to the subtle in-
troduction of a certain type of retroactivity into
the principles of the CBD, which would thus ap-
ply to gene banks, for instance.
1.3 An opportunity to expand into fields not
strictly envisaged by the CBD
For Southern countries and NGOs, the Pro-
tocol also offered an opportunity to contribute
to a reform of intellectual property law, particu-
larly by linking the ABS system to the patent sys-
tem. As things stand today, patent requests may
be lodged for innovations made on the basis of a
resource, without the patentability requirements
including observance by the inventor of rights
engendered by the ABS regime.
One legal instrument in particular was thus
the subject of considerable debate. This was the
certificate of geographical and/or legal origin,
designed to prove that the resource had been
acquired pursuant to the CBD and the national
legislation of the supplier country (consent by
communities and States, benefit-sharing con-
tract), and to be included in patent applications.
Certain States have already implemented their
own system. For instance, this certificate of ori-
gin was deployed in Brazilian patent law in early
2010. International recognition of certificates of
origin would require a review of the whole of
intellectual property law and the WTO’s Trade-
Related aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
(TRIPS), thereby introducing a new patentabili-
ty criterion.
1.4  The case of private users and
indigenous communities
The Protocol represented both a threat and
an opportunity for private stakeholders in the use
of genetic resources – a motley category brin-
ging together major pharmaceutical and cosme-
tics firms as well as public and private sector re-
searchers alongside companies exploiting niche
markets. Despite this considerable breadth of
objectives and interests, one common desire did
appear to emerge: solving ABS issues once and
for all, in order to have a clear legal framework
allowing stakeholders to act in a proper manner
and protect themselves from accusations of bio-
piracy.
In addition, the CBD offered a magnificent
platform on which to highlight conflicting world-
views and focus on the situation of indigenous
local communities. Instrumentalizing the issue of
biodiversity has enabled considerable progress to
be made in national legislation as regards the ri-
ghts of such communities. Demands regarding
“intangible components” (related traditional kno-
wledge) have become a preferred avenue for
making communities’ voices heard and defending
their rights, at the same time as speaking out
against the patentability of living organisms, ei-
ther on principle or in the light of its shortcomin-
gs. This is despite the fact that the CBD refers
only to the “knowledge, innovations and practi-
ces of indigenous and local communities embo-
dying traditional lifestyles relevant for the con-
servation and sustainable use of biological di-
versity” in Article 8j. Article 10c makes mention
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of “customary use of biological resources in
accordance with traditional cultural practices”.
Although these provisions themselves have rela-
tively little legal importance, they have someti-
mes been interpreted in a way which is favorable
to communities in national legislation. For ins-
tance, in Brazil, a dual form of Prior Informed
Consent (PIC) is required: that of the State, in
order to have access to the genetic resource, and
that of the local community in question in order
to have access to traditional knowledge. Article
15 of the CBD concerns only the Parties, but
some States tend to recognize communities as
parties which may be involved in benefit-sharing
in their own right. The Nagoya Protocol could
have either confirmed this trend or weakened it.
2. Clarity and lack thereof in the
Protocol
The text of the Protocol, made up mostly
of provisions which were not the subject of any
prior consensus, was presented on the final day
by the Japanese presidency of the COP. The Sta-
tes had a whole day in which they could either
accept it en bloc after amendments, or reject it.
Agreement was far from certain: nonetheless, it
was achieved and despite disappointment on the
part of certain Southern nations, it received a
favorable welcome. A number of factors contri-
buted to this outcome. One was the skill of the
Japanese master of ceremonies. Using a techni-
que that had been tried and tested in Copenha-
gen, he succeeded in getting together a small
group of influential nations (the EU, Brazil,
Norway and the African group) which was in a
good position to submit a consensus-based text
to a majority which could not reach an agree-
ment. There was a common desire not to leave
on a note of failure and not to be held responsi-
ble for accepting the continuing erosion of bio-
diversity. Above all, there was a double game
being played by those countries that were both
users and suppliers of biological materials. The-
se members of both the G20 and the G77 group
of nations also had interests in other internatio-
nal negotiations underway, such as those of the
WTO, and did not wish the field of application
of the CBD to interfere with these other dyna-
mics.
To what extent has the Protocol clarified
the CBD? Does it implement any new principles?
How did the compromises come about? Do the
stakeholders now have a clear framework? To
what extent might the Protocol compromise pre-
vious gains? This section will answer these ques-
tions while considering the diversity of points of
view: The States’, the genetic resources users’
and the indigenous and local communities’.
2.1 From States’ point of view
In spite of some condemnation4 and some
rather measured responses (for instance, that of
the European Union), the Nagoya Protocol is a
genuine compromise text, satisfying both suppli-
er and user States. Working on a traditional basis
of “give-and-take”, the notions of derivatives and
retroactivity were cunningly sidestepped, and the
principle of responsibility of user States for their
nationals was enshrined.
As we have seen, Northern countries de-
manded that questions relating to ABS should
be regulated by supplier countries. For their part,
Southern countries demanded that controls
should also be carried out at the other end of the
line, at patent and customs offices and research
institutes in Northern countries, to check that
their researchers had acquired samples legally.
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In the end, the Northern countries accepted the
principle of an integrated resource control and
monitoring procedure being implemented. Article
12 of the Protocol establishes that each Party has
to guarantee that the genetic resources used wi-
thin its jurisdiction have been subject to prior, in-
formed consent and that jointly agreed conditions
have been established, pursuant to legislation or
internal requirements governing the access to and
sharing of the other Party’s benefits. At least the-
oretically, a link has been established between le-
gislation in different States: user States were made
responsible for checking that their nationals had
properly observed the standards of the supplier
State. This principle of dual control will not be
without its problems in operational terms: in any
event, the Parties are required to co-operate “whe-
rever possible and as appropriate” in the event of
an alleged breach of legislation or internal requi-
rements regarding access to and sharing of bene-
fits. To achieve this, control points, in addition to
rather than instead of national jurisdictions, will
have to be set up by the Parties. A wide range of
possibilities may be envisaged: one such idea whi-
ch has gained traction in certain quarters is for
scientific reviews to be required to verify the con-
ditions in which the authors of articles obtained
the natural substances which are the subject of their
research.
At the same time, the issue of the reform of
patent legislation, with the creation of a certifica-
te specifying that the biological substance at the
origin of the biotechnological innovation has been
acquired pursuant to the Protocol, was not dealt
with. Within the Protocol, the Southern nations
abandoned the idea of requiring control on the part
of patent offices. This issue can probably only be
dealt with in negotiations on the Substantive Pa-
tent Law Treaty, which is to be negotiated at the
World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO).
At present, only procedural aspects are harmoni-
zed internationally by the WIPO. For several ye-
ars now, the latter has sought to harmonize mate-
rial aspects, including patentability criteria, pro-
bably with the intention of competing with the
WTO. The certificate referred to in the Protocol
(art. 17-1-a-iii3, 17-2, 17-3 and 17-4) is not the
certificate of origin, which may be used, in the
patent system as lobbied for by the Southern coun-
tries. Despite the semantic proximity (which is
certainly not accidental), this is nothing more or
less than a sort of identity card for resources, des-
tined to be used solely for informational purposes
as part of the ABS Clearing-House set up by the
Protocol (Art. 14).
Following a major controversy, another
concession to Southern nations was made. Du-
ring the avian influenza epidemic, Indonesia su-
pplied foreign laboratories with strains from whi-
ch vaccines were manufactured. No benefit-sha-
ring, or even preferential access to vaccines was
observed. While this issue relating to pathogens
would normally have been the responsibility of
the World Health Organization (WHO), the Pro-
tocol provides for access to pathogens in the
event of medical emergency, and also provides
for compensation in this respect.
The Protocol was also an opportunity to dis-
cuss the competencies of various international ins-
titutions. Its field of application is immediately res-
tricted by a plethora of multilateral initiatives, in-
cluding the International Treaty of the FAO, which
deals with plant resources for food and agriculture
– this already includes some 60 plants in its multila-
teral system and could cater for others; the FAO
Commission on Genetic Resources for Food and
Agriculture (CGRFA), which deals with resources
of plant and animal origin; the FAO’s International
Plant Protection Convention (IPPC); the Internati-
onal Union for the Protection of New Varieties of
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Plants (UPOV), which offers legal protection for
those who obtain new plant varieties, and which is
also seeking to cover other improved plants; and
the World Intellectual Property Organization
(WIPO), which has started examining the issue,
setting up an intergovernmental committee on in-
tellectual property and genetic resources, traditio-
nal knowledge and folklore (IGC). There is thus a
considerable amount of overlap. Ultimately, nego-
tiations relating to the Protocol allowed a degree
of order to be brought to the way international ins-
truments dovetail, even if diverging interpretations
are likely to emerge as new, more specialized stan-
dards are adopted. The Protocol does not apply to
human genetic resources or to genetic resources
over which sovereign States do not exercise sove-
reign rights (for instance, in international waters).
In particular, the Protocol does not apply to gene-
tic resources covered by sectoral ABS instruments
(particularly those used for food and farming cove-
red by the FAO), nor does it apply to genetic re-
sources used as raw materials (i.e. with no research
and development activity) for the purposes of food
or farming.
At the same time, concepts felt to be unac-
ceptable by Northern countries were also left out.
There is no direct reference to all the discussions
relating to retroactivity (a word which is conspi-
cuously absent from the Protocol) fuelled by the
African group, which was lobbying for compen-
sation for the exploitation of the continent’s re-
sources during the colonial period. While it may
still be argued that access to herbaria and other
collections established prior to 1993 is always
new in the light of scientific progress and new
uses, in this case compensation is provided for
through a multilateral benefit-sharing mechanism,
with funding to be incumbent on companies.
Similarly, the issue of derivatives was also
sidelined. Derivatives are defined in Article 2e as
“a naturally occurring biochemical compound
resulting from the genetic expression or meta-
bolism of biological or genetic resources, even
if it does not contain functional units of heredi-
ty.” However, no further mention is made of
them. This definition was probably kept for poli-
tical reasons, but it can be assumed that it will
have little effect, since the Protocol contains no
obligations in this respect. By presenting deriva-
tives as nothing more than a biochemical com-
pound from a living organism, claims relating to
synthetic molecules with a structure similar to a
natural substance fall outside the scope of the
Protocol. It would therefore appear that a natu-
ral molecule which has been synthesized and al-
tered does not fall within the scope of the Proto-
col, even if it was “inspired” by nature.
The issue of whether derivatives are inclu-
ded in the scope is therefore moot. However, it
can nevertheless be argued that the field of ap-
plication of the CBD has been expressly broade-
ned. Indeed, genetic resources are no longer vi-
ewed solely as genetic information or material
containing the functional units of heredity. The
use of genetic resources is defined as “to con-
duct research and development on the genetic
and/or biochemical composition of genetic re-
sources, including through the application of
biotechnology as defined in Article 2 of the Con-
vention” (Art. 2c). This broadening out from the
field of genetics in the strict sense of the term to
that of biochemicals is in line with industrial and
commercial realities, research practices, and at
the end of the day, the demands of the Southern
countries.
2.2 From the point of view of users
The Protocol may represent a good com-
promise for States, in which responsibilities have
been balanced and concepts perceived as dange-
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rous have been avoided. We now examine the
situation for users who, at least in their official
capacity, are seeking a framework which is suffi-
ciently clear to conduct and determine which
activities which may be covered by ABS.
It would appear that unless and until fur-
ther clarification is added at a national level, the
Protocol cannot address the practical questions
which may be raised by users. For instance, whe-
re is the limit between the use of resources in the
context of ABS (research and development) –
and thus within the scope of the Protocol – and
the creation of added value on the basis of com-
modities which are traded daily in large quantiti-
es? Gum arabic, which is used for the manufac-
ture of labels, paint and as a food thickener, is
one instance of this. Similarly, how can products
which are already manufactured but which are
of biological origin (such as fibers) be dealt with?
Do they require an ABS contract, or is a stan-
dard commercial contract enough? A different
case again is that of intermediaries who trade in
plants without knowing whether they will be sub-
sequently used in research and development. The
issue then becomes one of knowing whether each
contract in the chain should provide for a return
of any benefits to the start of the chain. The un-
realistic and unlikely consequences of such an
approach are clear.
There is also the question of the impact of
the Protocol on legal frameworks which have
already been developed on the basis of a certain
interpretation of the CBD. For instance, Brazil
treats essential oils and raw extracts in a particu-
lar way. Resolution 29 of December 6, 2007 by
the Conselho de Gestão do Patrimônio Genéti-
co (CGEN) removes from the field of applicati-
on of ABS the development of “fixed oils, essen-
tial oils and extracts” when these are the results
of isolation, extraction or purification, and when
the characteristics of the final product are “subs-
tantially equivalent to the original raw material”.
This means that if a firm wishes to market an
essential oil using resources located on private
land, it does not need to request any authorizati-
on from a public authority. Could the Protocol
call this practice into question?
Similarly, there is the question of whether
the leeway granted in a number of cases by Sta-
tes following assessment of the implications of
certain scientific activity could be compromised.
For instance, in Brazil, CGEN Resolution 21 (of
August 31st, 2006) removes from the scope of
ABS certain types of research and scientific acti-
vity (taxonomy, systematics, phylogeny, etc.)
which use molecular methodological tools in a
“circumstantial” manner but whose objective is
not access to genetic heritage per se. This reso-
lution has relieved congestion in access proce-
dures and facilitated the work of researchers. Is
Article 6a of the Protocol liable to call into ques-
tion this “entitlement” granted for the purposes
of research? It is not possible to presume so on
the basis of the letter of the clause5: it will be up
to States to decide.
2.3 From the perspective of indigenous and
local communities
The fact that traditional knowledge was
included in the Protocol was not a foregone con-
clusion. Indeed, some hoped that a further Pro-
tocol would deal with the rights of local com-
munities to their resources and knowledge. The
Protocol scrupulously avoids defining the lat-
ter. In particular, the scope of obligations on
States with respect to this knowledge is very
limited, a fact which is little different in subs-
tance from the CBD. Even if “dual PIC” has
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now become official, as has the scenario in whi-
ch communities to have rights not only to kno-
wledge but also to genetic resources present on
their territory, all this remains at the discretion
of States. A Protocol with a stronger normative
emphasis could have placed certain countries
such as France in a delicate position: for the
latter, despite certain contortions to deal with
issues such as those of Native Americans in
French Guiana, the recognition of specific ri-
ghts to the benefit of indigenous communities
remains theoretically unconstitutional. Conse-
quently, the Protocol follows the line taken in
Article 8j of the CBD, applied “subject to nati-
onal legislation” – something which has been
seen by many as an aberration in terms of inter-
national law, with States being able to declare
that their law took precedence over the inter-
national convention they were ratifying (Filo-
che, 2009).
Similarly, four draft decisions were sub-
mitted to the COP by the chair of the Article 8j
Working Group. The most important of these
related simply to taking into consideration – with
a view to an as yet highly theoretical adoption –
of an ethical code of conduct suitable for ensu-
ring respect for the cultural and intellectual he-
ritage of indigenous and local communities. As
things stand, the code of conduct clearly speci-
fies that its provisions are discretionary in natu-
re. Consequently, there is no legal obligation,
and they cannot be interpreted as affecting in-
ternational or national law. The purpose of the-
se provisions is to provide guidance in the draf-
ting of frameworks governing interactions be-
tween communities, ministries, researchers, in-
dustry and so on. They list fairly general princi-
ples such as transparency, prior consent, the
recognition of communities’ social structures,
and so on.
Conclusion: The Long and Winding
Road
The Protocol was opened for signature on
February 2, 2011, for a period of one year. It will
become effective once 50 countries have ratified
it. The CBD Secretariat expects it to become
effective by 2015. However, a number of pro-
blems have already arisen. For instance, the Fren-
ch Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs has
rejected the French version of the Protocol as
translated by the CBD’s Secretariat. During the
course of a three-month “observation” procedu-
re, no fewer than 115 observations and requests
for changes have been sent to the Secretariat.
Even if the answers from the Secretariat are de-
emed satisfactory, France will not be signing the
Protocol before mid-May.
Brazil, on the other hand, has already sig-
ned the text and stated that it is highly satisfied,
despite having arrived at the bargaining table with
a large number of demands. In general, the Pro-
tocol has been celebrated as the greatest success
in the history of the CBD. In France, the Secre-
tary of State for Ecology, Chantal Jouanno, an-
nounced that it was the first major agreement on
the environment since Kyoto. Strangely enough,
the EU responded with only very faint praise,
along with proposing some steps6. Nothing has
been heard from the United States and few NGOs
have condemned the agreement. Statements have
been couched in terms such as “a masterpiece of
creative ambiguities” (Earth Negotiations Bulle-
tin, 2010) or emphasized the fact that the glass
may be seen as half full or as half empty, but at
least it has not been broken. Be that as it may,
the Protocol has served as a diversion, to the
detriment of the binding commitments to com-
bat the erosion of biodiversity, which should have
been made by the international community. The
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Protocol does nothing more than record a trade
agreement on the use of genetic resources that
addresses the problems involved in implementing
the third objective of the Convention.
In summary, the Protocol, strategic action
plan and financial mechanism lead to the follo-
wing conclusions. When the litany of objectives
is observed7, it is easy to understand how the sig-
nature of a Protocol including binding financial
and legal commitments can be interpreted as a
victory. A concrete result has been obtained and
the framework for negotiations has been preser-
ved. Although it is more ambitious than the 2010
objective and deals with indirect causes of biodi-
versity loss, the strategic plan remains non-bin-
ding and somewhat imprecise. Similarly, there are
funding proposals: $2 billion worth of aid and
loans from Japan, but few other new commit-
ments; renewal of $1 billion worth of annual aid
from the EU; an increase to an annual •500 mi-
llion of Public Development Aid commitments
on the part of France from 2013 compared to
•100 million at present; but all this remains so-
mewhat vague.
In addition, the Intergovernmental Platform
on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services (IPBES),
a panel of experts designed to complement that
of the IPCC and negotiated within the framework
of the CBD and the United Nations Environment
Programme (UNEP), was ratified by a resoluti-
on of the United Nations General Assembly on
December 21, 2010. It may be hoped that this
scientific platform can acquire the legitimacy re-
quired to influence conservation policies.
The outcome of Nagoya is probably best
understood in terms of the economics of con-
vention, political science and study of the dyna-
mics at work in negotiations. Analysis in terms
of a North-South confrontation is rendered more
complex by the ambivalent stance of emerging
nations, while a gap is widening between ideolo-
gical-based demands and legal formalism, with
the latter ultimately taking precedence at the ne-
gotiating table. There may have been disappoint-
ment on the part of some that indigenous peo-
ples did not obtain more rights by means of the
Protocol; it is highly likely that those concerned
will continue lobbying for more within the fra-
mework of the CBD. In addition, it is clear that
this Protocol alone cannot solve all the major is-
sues facing the stakeholders.
It is nonetheless surprising that this issue of
benefit-sharing continues to arouse so many pas-
sions when, at the end of the day, there are so
few benefits to share, since natural substances in
tropical forests (with or without additional kno-
wledge) are no a longer anything like a major
focus of the strategy of major pharmaceutical
companies. Even for ETC – the NGO, which
devised the concept of biopiracy, with the Cap-
tain Hook award going to the worst offender at
each COP – the issues now lie elsewhere. To de-
fend biodiversity, ETC (2010) is now speaking
out against synthetic biology, bionanotechnolo-
gies and the evils of climate geoengineering.
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 A financial mechanism designed to encourage a
reduction in deforestation and damage to fo-
rests in developing countries. In the wake of
the Copenhagen climate conference, the REDD
program appears as the kind of solution for
which progress in terms of practical implemen-
tation is possible – in parallel to, if not altoge-
ther independently from, the climate conventi-
on.
2
 This group was set up following the Cancun
meeting in February 2002. The original partici-
pants were Brazil, China, Colombia, Costa Rica,
Ecuador, India, Indonesia, Kenya, South Afri-
ca and Venezuela. DR Congo, Bolivia, Malay-
sia, Madagascar, Peru and the Philippines joi-
ned subsequently.
3
 This recognizes “the sovereign rights of States
over their natural resources” and therefore goes
on to assert that “the authority to determine
access to genetic resources rests with the nati-
onal governments and is subject to national le-
gislation”.
4The Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our
America – Peoples’ Trade Treaty (ALBA - TCP)
(“Alianza Bolivariana para los Pueblos de
Nuestra América - Tratado de Comercio de los
Pueblos” in Spanish), a group sponsored by
Bolivia and Venezuela, appears to condemn the
Protocol because it enshrines the principle of
commoditization of living organisms.
5
 “In the development and implementation of its
access and benefit-sharing legislation or regu-
latory requirements, each Party shall… Create
conditions to promote and encourage research
which contributes to the conservation and sus-
tainable use of biological diversity, particularly
in developing countries, including through sim-
plified measures on access for non-commercial
research purposes, taking into account the need
to address a change of intent for such resear-
ch.”
6
 In 2011, the European Commission will launch
a study on the impact of the Protocol on the
EU system. In particular, it will seek to deter-
mine how competencies are allocated between
the Union and Member States, as well as the
legal form (a Directive or a Regulation) action
by the Union should take.
7
 The halving or halting of the destruction of na-
tural habitats; the extension of protected areas
from 13% to 17% for land and internal waters,
from 1% - 10% for seas and coastal areas; res-
toration of 15% of damaged ecosystems; elimi-
nation of subsidies which are harmful to the
environment; fish stocks managed sustainably
by 2020, etc.

